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"Hunnuh mus' tek cyare da root fa heal da tree" is a Gullah proverb. "One must
take care of the root to heal the tree," emphasizes that solving a problem or holistically caring
for or healing anything requires taking care of the "root," or the essence, of the thing. Queen
Quet, We Are Not an Island, SOJOURNERS 33 (Aug. 2014). In this sense, the "root" of South
Carolina's Lowcountry is its waterways.
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INTRODUCTION

South Carolina's Lowcountry, a culturally and ecologically unique area
ranging from Charleston to the Savannah River, is experiencing rapid urban
expansion and industrialization that puts at risk the health of the salt water
marshes, rivers, and beaches' that have played an integral role in the lives of
the local populations for more than three-hundred years.2 For generations,
locals have pulled their livelihood from, traded via, and recreated on the
rivers and beaches of the Low County. 3 The self-sustaining and isolated
nature of the Lowcountry has allowed for the development of regionally
unique cultures such as the Gullah;4 historical treasures like Charleston,
Beaufort, Bluffton, and Savannah;' and exclusively local norms such as
painting windowsills and porch roofs "Haint Blue," 6 the Gullah language
and storytelling, the crafting of sweetgrass baskets, Frogmore Stew (aka
Lowcountry Boils), 9 and oyster roasts.' 0

1.
Marshes, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/marsh.cfm (last visited Jan. 20,
2017) [hereinafter Marshes].
2.
History
of
the
City,
CHARLESTON,
S.C.,
http://www.charlestonsc.gov/index.aspx?nid=110 (last visited Jan. 20, 2017); Guides to Beaufort, BEAUFORT, S.C.,
http://www.beaufortsc.org/guides/history/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
3.
See Ramon Jackson, Gullah Cultural Traditions: Origins and Practices,
CHARLESTON'S
AFRICAN
AM.
HERITAGE,
http://www.africanamericancharles
ton.com/gullah.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
5.
Due to their geographic location and strong sense of community, the Gullah have
been able to preserve more of their African cultural heritage than any other group of African
Americans: they speak a creole language similar to the Krio of Sierra Leone, are skilled in the
creation of African style handicrafts and enjoy a rich cuisine based primarily on rice. The
origin and traditions of this group are an important piece of South Carolina's historical puzzle.
By exploring their history and development, one gains a fuller picture of South Carolina's past.
Id.
6.
Although Savannah is located in Georgia, and is not the South Carolina
Lowcountry, it is nonetheless a shining example of Lowcountry culture.
7.
Michele Norris, Why so Blue? Color Graces Many a Porch Ceiling, NPR (Aug. 14,
2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5645263.
8.
Gullah is an English-based creole language containing many African loanwords and
significant influences from African languages in grammar and sentence structure. Gullah
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Aside from the Lowcountry's cultural richness, South Carolina's
Lowcountry also plays an integral role in maintaining the economic health of
the State." A 2009 study, "Underappreciate Assets: The Economic Impact
of South Carolina's Natural Resources" by the University of South Carolina
Moore School of Business, found that "well-managed natural resourced are
essential for economic development," and "South Carolina's natural
resources are essential for economic development and contribute nearly $30
billion and 230,000 jobs to the state's economy."1 2 Additionally, South
Carolina's Department of Natural Resources reports that in 2008, South
Carolina's Coastal Tourism, not including historic tourism, added value of
approximately $3.5 billion, supporting 81,000.13
Moreover, the importance of the Lowcountry's tidelands' ecology
extends beyond monetary value-in some sense, the health of the tidelands
has a direct effect on the health of the entire state. South Carolina is the
eleventh smallest state, but boasts the eleventh longest coastline l4 at 2876
miles of tidal shoreline. 15 The 350,000 square acres of tidal marshes along
South Carolina's coastline, comprising 30% of all tidal marsh in the United
States' eastern seaboard,
function as natural filtration and drainage

History, GUIDES TO BEAUFORT, http://www.beaufortsc.org/guides/gullah-history/ (last visited
Jan. 18, 2017).
8.
Sweetgrass baskets are almost identical in style to the shukublay baskets of Sierra
Leone, a tradition brought to the region by the Gullah during the West African slave trade in
the
17th
century.
The
Origins
of
Sweetgrass
Baskets,
SCIWAY,
http://www.sciway.net/facts/sweetgrass-baskets.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2017).
9.
Francine Maroukin, The Lowcountry in One Pot, GARDEN & GUN (June 2009),
http://gardenandgun.com/article/lowcountry-one-pot.
10. History
of
the
City,
CHARLESTON,
S.C.,
http://www.charlestonsc.gov/index.aspx?nid=110 (last visited Jan. 20, 2017); Guides to Beaufort, BEAUFORT, S.C.,
http://www.beaufortsc.org/guides/history/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
11. Id.
12. Economic Impact ofS.C.'s Natural Resources and the SCDNR, S.C. DEP'T OF NAT.
RES., http://www.dnr.sc.gov/overview/impact.html (last visited Jan 18. 2017) [hereinafter
Economic Impact].
13. Id.
14. Geography: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/
faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_00_SF_GCTPH1.USO1PR&prod
Type=table (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
15.

Coastal

Environment,

S.C.

DEPT.

OF

HEALTH

&

ENVTL.

CONTROL,

http://www.sedhec.gov/HomeAndEnvironment/Water/YourCoastalEnvironment/mindex.htm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
16. Kim Counts & Laura Lee Rose, Life Along the Salt Marsh: Protecting Tidal Creeks
with Vegetative Buffers, S.C. WATERWAYS (Nov. 2013), http://www.clemson.edu/extension/
hgic/water/resourcesstormwater/lifealongthe salt marshprotectingtidal creeks with ve
getative buffers.html [hereinafter Life Along the Salt Marsh].
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systems, preventing mainland flooding by providing a runoff area.
Furthermore, tideland vegetation buffers rough and quick flowing waters,
acting as a natural breakwater and preventing coastline erosion. But, most
importantly, tideland vegetation provides for the foundation of the food web
for the entire southeastern seaboard, as well as offering habitat and nesting
sites for numerous species of water fowl, migratory birds, and commercially
and recreationally important fish, crabs, clams, and oysters.1 9 The salt marsh
is ranked as one of the most biologically productive ecosystems on earth,
providing nursery grounds for many species of birds and fish, as well as vital
wildlife habitat. 20
However, despite the multitude of reasons the State has to protect its
beaches and tidelands, overdevelopment and industrial growth poses a dire
21
threat to the health of the Lowcountry's waterways, culture, and economy.
Litter, household garbage, and harmful runoff pollution from sprawling
suburban communities, poorly designed urban areas, golf courses, highways,
and industrial waste from manufacturing plants all wash into the tidelands
and ocean after every rain, polluting the waterways and putting at risk the
health of the ecological system and, subsequently, the economic health of
22
the entire State.
If onshore overdevelopment is not enough, the
Lowcountry also faces risks that coincide with impending oil drilling off the
23
coast.
Ultimately, while the State and its municipalities have viable
interests in the economic growth that accompany development, unchecked
development puts at risk the environment that already provides so much,
24
economically and culturally speaking, for the State and its denizens. This
raises the question as to whether the development-derived benefits are worth
the environmental/cultural/economic costs, and, if so, whether the State is
even permitted to act on this assessment. Arguably, even if the State were to
conclude that the economic value of development in the Lowcountry
surpassed the costs, South Carolina's Public Trust Doctrine precludes the
State from permitting such development.

17. Marshes, supranote 1.
18. Id
19. Life Along the Salt Marsh, supra note 16.
20. Id
21. See id.
22. Id See also Economic Impact, supra note 12 (asserting that South Carolina's
economy is highly dependent upon the health and maintenance of the State's natural
resources).
23. Project
Offshore
Drilling,
COASTAL
CONSERVATION
LEAGUE,
http://coastalconservationleague.org/projects/offshore-drilling-2/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
24. See Life Along the Salt Marsh, supra note 16.
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This Note will discuss in Part I the history of the Public Trust Doctrine
and why under the United States' system of federalism there are fifty
separate public trusts. Part II will introduce the reader to both modem and
traditional iterations of the Public Trust Doctrine and attempt to convince the
reader that the Modem Public Trust Doctrine is more suitable to the present
25
state of affairs than the Traditional Public Trust Doctrine. Part III reaches
the conclusion that South Carolina has a Modem Public Trust Doctrine by
way of a thorough review of statutes and case law regarding private actions
related to Public Trust property. 26 Finally, Part IV explores various claims
against the State and third-party developers for harm to the Public Trust,
including the possibility of applying actual trust law to Public Trust
interests, with the State playing the role of trustee, and interested denizens
27
playing the roles of beneficiaries of the trust.

II.

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST

A.

The Roots of the Doctrine

The Public Trust Doctrine has a long and nuanced history. While the
21
doctrine's origins likely predate codification, the oldest existing recorded
representation of a law that established a communal public interest in
waterways, the lands beneath them, and their adjacent shorelines was
established in the Institutes of Justinian during the tail end of the Roman
Empire, during the reign of Justinian I.29 From Justinian's Codex, the
doctrine took hold throughout Europe under the reaches of the Roman
Empire.30 Ultimately, like countless other Roman laws and customs, the
doctrine survived the collapse of the Roman Empire and continued to be
enforced in some form or another in the European nations that formed

25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on
the Source andScope of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 428-31 (1989) (making
note of communal water interests in early African, Asian, European, Islamic, and Native
American customary law).
29. Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IowA L. REV. 631, 633-34 (1986)
(citing THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN bk. 1, tit. 1, pts. 1-6, at 65 (J. Thomas trans. 1965) ("By
natural law, these things are common property of all: air, running water, the sea, and with it the
shores of the sea.")) [hereinafter ChangingConceptions].
3 0. Id.
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following collapse of the empire. 31 There is evidence the doctrine had was
enforced by the Spanish,32 French, 33 and English34 in the mid-thirteenth

century.35 Later, during the era of Spanish and British imperialism, the
doctrine rode the wave of colonization across the globe, and through this
36
mechanism, the Public Trust Doctrine made landfall in the Americas. The
British colonies, established along the eastern seaboard of North America,
were built upon English jurisprudence, and when the colonies later asserted
their independence from England, despite the newfound freedom from
British control, the British common law was so enmeshed in American
colonial culture that a complete break from it was impossible.37 The
sovereignty that had formerly been bestowed upon the Crown was now
vested in the individual states, and each state became the keeper of the land
in the public trust. 38

B.

The Public Trust in the United States

Since at least the 1820s, American courts have consistently invoked the
Public Trust Doctrine to preclude private ownership of and to preserve the
rights of the public to use of navigable waterways, their shores, and
resources. 39 A seminal case from 1821, Arnold v. Mundy, describes the
Public Trust Doctrine at the time:
[T]he navigable rivers, where the tide ebbs and flows, the ports,
the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the land
under the water, for the purposes of passing and repassing,

3 1.
32.
was taken
33.
Shackles,

Id
Id. at 634 n.13. (citing LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, pt. 3, tit. 28, laws 3, 4, 6) ("Partida 3
practically verbatim from Roman law.").
See Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 189 (1981) (citing M. BLOCH, FRENCH RURAL
HISTORY 183 (1966)) [hereinafter Liberating the Public Trust].
34. Changing Conceptions, supra note 29, at 635 (citing 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39, 40 (S. Thorne trans. 1968)).
35. Id. (citing H. BRACTON, 2 ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (S.
Thorne trans. 1968); R. CLARK, 4 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 99-100 (1967); Michael L.
Rosen, Public and Private Ownership Rights in Lands Under Navigable Waters: The
Governmental/ProprietaryDistinction,34 U. FLA. L. REV. 561, 565-67 (1982)).
36. See Changing Conceptions, supra note 29, at 634 n.14.
37. See generally RC Dale, The Adoption of the Common Law by the American
Colonies, AM. L. REG. (Sept. 1882) (discussing the inevitability of the adoption of British
Common Law in the American Colonies).
3 8. Id.
39. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1(1821).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss5/8

6

Tarver: Hunnuh Mus' Tek Cyare da Root fa Heal da Tree: Saving the South C
PROPERTY LAW

2017]

1053

navigation, fishing, fowling, and sustenance, and all the other uses
of the water and its products . . . . are common to all the people,
and . . . each [citizen] has a right to use [the water and its products]

according to his pleasure, subject only to the laws which regulate
that use; . . . the property indeed vests in the sovereign, but it vests

in him for the sake of order and protection, and not for his own use,
but for the use of the citizen; in the same sense in which he holds all
the public property and the domains of the [sovereign], that the
proceeds thereof may be collected into the public treasury, and
applied to the public benefit and the public defense, and that he may
have the direct, immediate, uncontrolled enjoyment of them.
Another pivotal case considered to have historically defined the scope of
the Public Trust Doctrine, and one that remains a primary authority, is
Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois.4' As defined by Illinois Central, under
the Public Trust Doctrine:
[T]he state holds the title to the lands under the navigable
waters . . . within its limits, in the same manner that the state holds
title to soils under tide water, . . . and that title necessarily carries

with it control over the waters above them, whenever the lands are
subjected to use.

. .

. It is a title held in trust for the people of the

state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them, and have liberty offishing therein, freedfrom
42
the obstruction or interference ofprivateparties.
Illinois Central establishes the ground rules of the American Public
Trust Doctrine: a State has an inalienable duty to protect private citizens'
rights to navigation, commerce, and liberty to fish (all of which may be read,
presumably, as the public's right to access to the water, first and foremost).43
However, as explained in the next section, many States have expanded upon
Illinois Central.
C.

The Fifty Public Trusts of the Individual States

Despite the Supreme Court's rulings with regard to the baseline scope of
the Public Trust Doctrine, states are constitutionally empowered to govern

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 12.
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
Id.
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the public trust lands within their own boundaries. 4 Under the jurisprudence
of the United States, the singular British Public Trust Doctrine evolved into
fifty separate and unique doctrines, broadening in scope and depth as a
response to differences in cultural and geographical needs in each state.45
Over the last century, technological advances, population growth,
industrialization, and environmental awareness have all influenced a variety
46
of changes to doctrine. Case law from a different jurisdictions illustrates
the variance in scope and implementation of the Public Trust Doctrinef.
III. THE

MODERN
DOCTRINE

TRENDS

IN

APPLICATION

OF

THE

PUBLIC

TRUST

There are multiple scholarly theories floating in the ether regarding how
the Public Trust Doctrine should be applied. For purposes of efficiency,
these theories may be categorized as two primary groups: the traditional
view and the modem view. The traditional view understands the doctrine as
an inflexible rule that should not evolve beyond its original parameters
established in Imperial England, or Illinois Central, depending on the
theory. 48 The traditional views may vary slightly, but typically include
iterations wherein the sovereign owns only land under waters that are subject
to the tides or lands beneath navigable in fact waters for use by the public for
a narrowly prescribed list of purposes, generally limited to rights to
navigation, fishing, and commerce. 49 Alternatively, states that subscribe to
the modem view, which sprang forth during the environmentalist movement
of the 1970's, generally have more expansive interpretations of the
doctrine.5 0 Under the modem view, the doctrine is understood to be a legal
Swiss Army knife by which citizens may require a state to protect

44. See Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 367 (1842).
45. See, e.g., Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 1 (expanding on the British Common Law's Public
Trust, as discussed above).
46. Changing Conceptions, supra note 29, at 684-87.
47. Some States' theories suggest the public trust ought to include air quality, art,
cemeteries, historical battlegrounds and other publicly devoted lands. See Hope Babcock, Is
Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Public Parkland from Visual Pollution Justifiable
Doctrinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 12-23 (2015) (discussing the pros and cons of
expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine to prevent construction of a commercial building that
would "tower over the tree line" of a public park).
48. See generally, Changing Conceptions, supra note 29 (discussing ancient variations
of the Public Trust Doctrine and its application in modem times); Liberating the Public Trust,
supra note 33 (pushing for a more expansive Public Trust Doctrine under the theory that in the
face of modem threats, the doctrine must expand to suit the original intentions of the doctrine).
50. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
50. See Liberating the Public Trust, supra note 33, at 490.
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enumerated trust interests via a variety of methods.5 ' Admittedly, some
modem view practitioners and scholars have expanded the doctrine beyond
recognition 52but law evolves with society, and this push to expand is
arguably a sign of a healthy legal system.
A.

TraditionalView v. Modern View

The traditional view of the doctrine is flawed for one reason-law must
evolve with the needs and social mores of society, or else the law becomes
obsolete. The traditional view is inapplicable to questions presented by
modem issues. The public policies of ancient Rome, England, and 1890's
America are so far culturally and technologically removed from the issues of
modem American states that the ancient iteration of the doctrine is nearly
irrelevant. Applying the ancient doctrine to modem issues is akin to
applying medieval medical treatments to modem disease-imagine
presenting your physician with complaints of headaches and the physician
prescribes drilling into your skull to relieve pressure. At some point, this
treatment was likely cutting-edge, but has since become obsolete. Just as
medieval medical practitioners had little knowledge of the various
mechanism of headaches and no knowledge of aspirin, ancient jurists likely
could not conceptualize the harm caused to public trust interests by
industrial pollution, oil spills, agricultural and golf course runoff,
commercial overfishing, and rising shorelines as a result of global warming.
Thus, like any other doctrinal theory that America inherited from England,
the public trust must change with the times and needs of the public.53
Conversely, the modem view of the Public Trust Doctrine is better
suited for modem American states with growing populations, urban and
industrial development and manufacturing. Importantly, many states'
modem views provide a method by which private parties with particular
interests in the public trust can check the potentially detrimental actions of

51. Changing Conceptions, supra note 29, at 633-40 (explaining the traditionalist view
and history of the Public Trust Doctrine).
52. See Babcock, supra note 47, at 12-23 (discussing the pros and cons of expansion of
the Public Trust Doctrine).
53. For instance, the development of offertory estoppel from promissory estoppel.
Compare James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (1933) (holding that promissory
estoppel cannot be asserted to compel an offeror to perform where the offer is not meant to
become a binding contract until consideration is received), with Drennan v. Star Paving Co.,
51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958) (holding that an offer which the offeror should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite character by the offeree, and which does
induce such action or forbearance, is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the
offer by estoppel).
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governments or their agents that have lost sight of the importance of
maintaining the trust in lieu of attracting developers and industry to the
*54
region.
B. Examples ofModern Public Trust States
Presently, there are a variety of states that have expanded their Public
Trust Doctrine, in some cases going as far as to constitutionalize it.55 The
following discussion examines case law from three states with expansive
Public Trust Doctrines, California, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania, in an attempt
to illustrate the reasoning and purpose behind such expansion for later
analogous comparison with South Carolina's doctrine.
1.

California

California has one of the most expansive Public Trust Doctrines. In
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of
California held that the Public Trust Doctrine imposed an affirmative duty
on the state to protect people's common heritage of streams, lakes,
marshlands, and tidelands, and may surrender that right only in rare cases
when abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.5 7

Furthermore, the court held that any member of the public had standing
under the Public Trust Doctrine to sue a state agency to enjoin any actions
58
injurious to the interests of the public under the trust.

The dispute in Audubon Society began in the 1940's, when a state
agency began diverting the water that fed Mono Lake into an aqueduct that
supplied water to the City of Los Angeles. 59 Consequently, the level of
Mono Lake dropped and the surface area diminished by one-third, putting at

54. See generally Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 166 Cal. App. 4th
1349, 83 Cal. Rptr 588 (2008) (holding that under California trust law, a private party may
hold the State accountable as a trustee for any harm the State permitted upon the Public Trust).
55. See, e.g., PA. CONST., Art. I, § 27 ("The people have a right to clean air, pure water,
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.").
56. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
57. Id at 724.
58. Id at 716 n.Il (citing Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 261-62, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790,
797, 491 P.2d 374, 381 (1971)).
59. Id. at 711.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol68/iss5/8

10

Tarver: Hunnuh Mus' Tek Cyare da Root fa Heal da Tree: Saving the South C
PROPERTY LAW

2017]

1057

risk the "scenic beauty and ecological values of the lake."6 0 Plaintiffs
Audubon Society filed suit to enjoin the state agency from diverting the
water under the theory that the lake's shore, bed, and waters were protected
by the public trust. The court reasoned that under California law, the public
trust imposes a duty upon the State to protect the people's common rights to
62
streams, lakes, marshlands, and tidelands. As a fiduciary of the people and
guardian of the public trust resources, the State was bound by a duty not to
allow damage to the public trust without an overriding public interest.63
Under this analysis, the State breached its duty to the public and overreached
its authority when it began diverting water to such a degree that it harmed
the trust interests in Mono Lake.64
Later, in 2008, in Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group,
Inc., a California Court of Appeals applied California trust law to analyze
the powers and duties of the Public Trust Doctrine, ultimately determining
that plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the trust, may bring action against the
appropriate agency of the state, responsible as trustee of the public trust, to
compel that agency to bring action against the private parties that allegedly
violated the trust.66 Additionally, the court held that if the appropriate state

agencies failed to bring such action, members of the public may alternatively
bring an action in equity joining the alleged violator of the trust and the state
agency in order to prevent loss of or prejudice to the claim.
In Centerfor Biological Diversity, Inc., private-party plaintiffs brought
action against private owners and operators of wind turbines, claiming that
operation of the turbines was responsible for killing and injuring raptors
which were protected as part of the public trust under California law.68 The
court reiterated the holding from Audubon Society: the Public Trust Doctrine
imposes a fiduciary duty on the state, in the same manner that traditional
trust law does on a trustee, to preserve the natural resources held in the
public trust for the benefit of the public.69 However, the court noted that

under traditional trust law, a beneficiary of a trust lacks standing to bring
action directly against a third party that harms the trust and, in such cases,

60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 724.

63.

Id.

64.
65.
Rptr. 588
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 732.
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 166 Cal. App. 4th 1349, 83 Cal.
(2008).
Id. at 1360-61, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
Id. at 1367, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
Id. at 1354, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
Id. at 1365-66, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 601 (citing Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 709).
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action must instead be brought by the trustee. 70 Thus, analogously, private
parties cannot enforce the Public Trust Doctrine against other private parties,
but the state can. Moreover, by analogizing Public Trust relationships
through the lens of traditional trust law, the court noted that a private citizen
with an interest in a benefit of the Public Trust has standing to judicially
compel the trustee-state to bring action against the tortfeasor third parties for
damages to the public trust. 72

2.

Hawaii

In 2012, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held a public trust claim can be
raised by members of the public who are affected by potential harm to the
public trust-a showing of injury-in-fact is not required for standing. 73 The
court reasoned that a citizen's interest in the public trust was a vested
74
property interest and therefore, standing was based upon due process.
Furthermore, the court held that where uncertainty about present or potential
threats of serious damage or degradation to the public trust exists, a
"trustee's duty to protect the resource mitigates in favor of choosing
presumptions that also protect the resource." Lastly, the court held that the
public trust "compels the state duly to consider the cumulative impact of
existing and proposed diversions on trust purposes and to implement
reasonable measures to mitigate [any] impact .

.

. requir[ing] planning and
,,76

decisionmaking from a global, long-term perspective.
Here, In re 'lao,
native organizations Hui 0 N5 Wai 'Eh and the Maui Tomorrow
Foundation sought review of a State decision by the Commission on Water
Resource Management that amended standards for diversions of water for
the Waihe'e River and the Waiehu, 'lao, and Waikapti Streams. Petitioners
asserted the decision would affect protected traditional and customary native
Hawaiian rights, appurtenant water rights, and the public trust.78 It is

70. Id at 1367, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 602 ("Under traditional trust concepts, plaintiff, viewed
as beneficiaries of the public trust as not entitled to bring action against those whom they
allege are harming trust property.
71. Id
72. Id at 1360-61, 83 Cal. Rptr at 596.
73. In re 'Tao Ground Water Mgmt. Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit
Applications, 287 P.3d 129, 183 (Haw. 2012).
74. Id at 141.
75. Id at 184 (quoting Waiahole I, In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,
466 (Haw. 2000)).
76. Id at 190 (quoting Waiahole I, In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 455).
78. Idat 132.
78. Id
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important to note here that under Hawaiian law, the Public Trust Doctrine
has been constitutionalized and requires the State to conserve and protect
Hawaii's natural beauty and resources, including land, water, air, minerals,
and energy sources for the benefit of present and future generations. 79 The
court, remarking on the constitutional nature of the issue, and basing its
reasoning on Audubon Society, determined that any public citizen of the
State who may be affected by potential harm has standing to bring action
under the Public Trust Doctrine 0 and the Public Trust Doctrine compels the
State to protect and conserve public trust resources by first considering the
cumulative impact of any planning and development on the environment in
the present as well as the future.8
3.

Pennsylvania

In 2013, in Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania,82 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that the constitutionalized Public Trust Doctrine of the
State imposed a fiduciary duty upon the State to protect and manage public
trust resources from present and future harm and misuse.8 3 There, the State's
Supreme Court faced determining the constitutionality of Act 13, legislation
that would permit the exploitation and recovery of natural gas located in the
Marcellus Shale, but would simultaneously risk severe environmental
effects.84 Immediately following Act 13's ratification by the Governor of
Pennsylvania, citizens filed a petition for review of the statute, requesting a
declaration that the Act violated the Pennsylvania Constitution and a
permanent injunction prohibiting application of the act. 1 The court
determined Act 13 was unconstitutional under the Pennsylvania
Constitution, which imposes upon the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania a
fiduciary obligation to "conserve and maintain," "prevent and remedy," and

79. HAW. CONST., Art. 11 § 1.
80. In re 'Iao Ground Water Mgmt. Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit
Applications, 287 P.3d at 183.
81. Id. at 190 (citing Waiahole I, In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 455).
82. Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
83. Id. at 959.
84. Id. at 914-16 ("The industry uses . . hydraulic fracturing or "fracking" and
horizontal drilling[,] . . [b]oth techniques inevitably do violence to the landscape.").
85. See PA. CONST., Art. I, § 27 ("The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and
to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.").
86. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 915.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 8
1060

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 68: 1047

"refrain from permitting or encouraging the degradation, diminution, or
depletion of' natural resources held in the public trust, whether such
damages would occur through state action or the state's failure to restrain the
action of private parties.8 7 Furthermore, the court reasoned that because the
constitution considered the beneficiaries of the trust as "all the people" of
the state, including unborn generations, the court reasoned that the state
owed a duty to protect the public trust for both present and future
generations, the interests of which the state is required to balance
impartially present and future interests being equal.
This line of
reasoning lead the court to conclude that the Public Trust Doctrine places a
duty on the state to protect natural resources in the public trust equally from
actions with immediate severe impacts on public trust as well as from
actions with minimal or insignificant present consequence that are likely to
have a significant or irreversible effect in the future.89
C. Resistance to the Modern Public Trust: Arguments for Traditional
Application
Despite the increasing number of courts that recognize the fiduciary
duty the Public Trust Doctrine places upon States, a recent decision in an
Oregon state court, currently pending appeal, shows that the movement is
not unanimous. 90 In May of 2015, an Oregon state court held, in Chernaikv.
Brown, that the state of Oregon does not consider the Public Trust Doctrine
to encompass the waters of the state, the beaches, shoreline, fish, or wildlife,
nor does the State owe a fiduciary duty under the Public Trust Doctrine to
the public to protect such resources.91
In Chernaik, Plaintiffs brought action against the Governor of Oregon
and the State requesting a Circuit Court to impose a fiduciary obligation on
the Defendants to protect the atmosphere from climate change, declare a
failure of the Defendants to do so, and compel Defendants to address the
92
impact of climate change. The court refused, but before one accepts this as
the final word on Oregon's view of the public trust, the entirety of the
circumstances surrounding the case should be reviewed objectively, as the

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id at 957.
Id at 959 (citing 1970 Pa. Legislative Journal-House at 2273).
Id.
Opinion and Order, Chernaik v. Brown, No. 16-11-09273, CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
STATE OF OR. FOR LANE CTY. (May 11, 2015), http://courts.oregon.gov/Lane/docs/
Chernaik%20v%2OBrown%200pinion.pdf
91. Id at 9-14.
92. Id at 15.
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refusal for the expansion of the trust may have been rooted in judicial
caution, rather than legal analysis.
First, the plaintiff asked for a lower court to expand the scope of the
existing public trust in Oregon. Regardless of the presiding Judge's personal
interpretation of Oregon's Public Trust Doctrine, the state court judge was
without the authority to make law, and such a ruling would effectively be
law. 93 This was an issue better left to legislative powers.94 Second, such
egregious expansion the scope of the public trust and imposing simultaneous
95
a duty upon the State to protect the trust assets95 would open the floodgates 96
of litigation in the Circuit Courts, clogging a likely already backlogged
system.97 Therefore, one should note that the court in Chernaikwas not only
powerless to hold otherwise, due to standing precedent, but also foresaw that
a decision to so rapidly expand the scope of the trust might cause more harm
than good.
Similar to the decision in Chernaik, a handful of states' courts prefer to
follow a Traditional Public Trust Doctrine. For example, Washington State
courts have consistently refused to discuss the scope and duty of the Public
Trust Doctrine, preferring instead to relegate the issue of control of waters to
legislative action.9 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Iowa, despite
recognizing that the Public Trust Doctrine is not necessarily limited to
navigation or commerce and acknowledging that other States had expanded
the scope of their public trusts, held that the court would not "subscribe to
broad applications of the doctrine," and defined the public trust as only
including navigation, commerce, and fishing. 99 Thus, it is clear that the trend
toward expanding the scope of Public Trust is not universal and proposing
such expansion in a conservative state may be met with some resistance.
IV. SOUTH CAROLINA'S STANCE ON THE PUBLIC TRUST
South Carolina, like California and Hawaii, is a State with an abundance
of coastline that plays a major role in the ecological and economic health of
the State.' 00 The role the Lowcountry has played in State is well known

93. Id. at 17.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 16.
96. Excuse the pun.
97. For similar results based on this reasoning, see Rettkowski v. Dept. of Ecology, 858
P.2d 232 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) and State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1989).
98. See Rettkowski, 858 P.2d at 239-40.
99. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d at 363.
100. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
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among locals and, as a result, Lowcountry natives are particularly protective
of their tidelands and beaches.' 0 ' Furthermore, for years South Carolina's
legislature has been protective of the State's natural resources, passing laws
and regulation regarding beach front management well before other states
did the same.102 While it is not certain that a South Carolina court would be
as expansive with the Public Trust as California, Hawaii, or Pennsylvania,
there is some indication that the courts lean toward a more modem view.
A.

The Scope ofSouth Carolina'sPublic Trust

There is no single writing that exhaustively defines the scope of South
Carolina's Public Trust Doctrine. Like many states' doctrines, our Public
Trust is primarily a creature of case law.' 03 While a narrow portion of the
scope of the doctrine (navigation rights) is included in our State's
constitution and statutory law, in order to give shape to the scope of our
State's doctrine, it is necessary to synthesize the codified adoptions of the
doctrine with the case law that reflects its implementation.1 04
First, regarding its physical parameters, South Carolina's Public Trust is
not notably expansive when compared to California, Hawaii, or
Pennsylvania. The South Carolina Supreme Court has held the State holds
presumptive title to land "below the high water mark of a navigable
stream."
Navigability of a waterway is established by a determination of
whether the waterway can be regularly floated for any purpose. o0The type
of flotation device used, and the specific use for which the flotation is
107
As a
implemented is not important to the determination of navigability.
result of this facet of the doctrine, the Lowcountry marshes and tidelands,
including the pluff mud below the mean high water mark, include an
immense amount of public trust land nearly a half-million acres. 08 Unlike

101. Id
102. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250, et seq. (2008).
103. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 354 S.C. 142, 580 S.E.2d 116 (2003) (citing a
number of decisions concerning the Public Trust Doctrine).
104. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-1-10, et seq. (2008 & Supp. 2014); McQueen, 354 S.C. at
142, 580 S.E.2d at 116.
105. Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assocs., 318 S.C. 119, 128, 456 S.E.2d 397, 402
(1995) citing State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 193 S.E.2d 497 (1972)).
106. State ex rel. Medlock v. S.C. Coastal Council, 289 S.C. 445, 449, 346 S.E.2d 716,
719 (1986).
107. Id (citing Heyward v. Farmers Mining Co., 19 S.E. 963, 971 (S.C. 1894)).
108. See Bradford W. Wyche, Tidelands and the Public Trust: An Applicationfor South
Carolina, 7 EcOLOGY L. Q. 137, 138-39 (1978) (citing South Carolina Environmental
Coalition, Tidelands 2 (1973) (brochure)).
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California, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania, the scope of South Carolina's Public
Trust does not include general natural resources and is limited only to lands
beneath the navigable waters and certain defined ancillary public rights of
use of those lands, the waters flowing over them, and the resources within.
With regard to the resources held in trust under the doctrine, some
resources are clearly included within statutory and case law, while others are
suggested but not confirmed. For instance, the State has constitutionalized
the State's duty to preserve the navigability of waterways;1 09 Case law
further expands the scope of resources to include commerce, recreation,
"marine life, water quality, [and] public access." 0 However, in SierraClub
v. Kiawah Resort Assocs., the Supreme Court of South Carolina, while
discussing the Public Trust Doctrine, noted:
The underlying premise of the Public Trust Doctrine is that
some things are considered too important to society to be owned by
one person. Traditionally, these things have included natural
resources such as air, water (including waterbome activities such as
navigation and fishing), and land (including but not limited to
seabed and riverbed soils). Under this Doctrine, everyone has the
inalienable right to breathe clean air; to drink safe water; to fish and
sail, and recreate upon the high seas, territorial seas and navigable
waters; as well as to land on the seashores and riverbanks."'
Thus, while the South Carolina General Assembly has not expressly
expanded the nature of South Carolina's public trust to the degree that
California, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania have, the State Supreme Court clearly
112
expressed in Sierra Club that it has a modem view of the doctrine.
Unfortunately, it is less clear whether a lower court faced with a Public Trust

109. S.C. CONST., Art. XIV, § 4. See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 49-1-10 (2008) ("All
streams which have been . . declared navigable streams . . shall be common highways and
forever free. . . . If any person shall obstruct any such stream . . . such person shall be guilty of

&

a nuisance. . . .").
110. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 354 S.C. 142, 149, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119-20
(2003) (citing Sierra Club, 318 S.C. at 119, 456 S.E.2d at 397). See also Cape Romain Land
Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928)
(holding that the purpose of the public trust is to protect navigation and fishery of navigable
waterways).
111. Sierra Club, 318 S.C. at 119, 456 S.E.2d at 402 (quoting Gregg L. Spyridon & Sam
A. LeBlanc, The Overriding Public Interest in Privately Owned Natural Resources:
Fashioninga Cause ofAction, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 287 (1993)).
112. See id.
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issue would rely on the dicta of Sierra Club or argue, like the court in
Chernaik, that such expansion can only be established by legislation.
B. Establishinga Duty Under the Public Trust Doctrine
1.

Statutorily Imposed Duties

The Supreme Court of South Carolina interpreted the legislation
creating the South Carolina Coastal Council'' 3 and the South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Services as implicitly charging the
council with a duty to manage and protect public trust lands in accordance
with the Public Trust Doctrine.1 4 Furthermore, Statutorily, the South
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control is explicitly
vested with duties to "promulgate necessary rules and regulations to carry
out the provisions of [the Coastal Tidelands and Wetlands] chapter"; to
administer the provisions of the chapter and all rules and regulations created
under it; "to examine, modify, approve or deny applications for permits for
activities covered by the provisions of [the] chapter;" "to revoke and
suspend permits of persons who fail or refuse to carry out or comply with
the terms and conditions of the permit;" "to enforce the provisions of [the]
chapter" and bring legal action against offensive parties; "manage estuarine
and marine sanctuaries and regulate all activities therein, including the
regulation of the use of the coastal waters located within the boundary of
such sanctuary."" 5
2.

An Argumentfor a Broader, Three-Tiered Common Law Duty

Additionally, expanding on the statutorily imposed duties of the
Department of Health and Environmental Control, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina has held that "[t]he state . . . cannot permit activity that
substantially impairs the public interest [in the trust]."" 6 This holding

arguably establishes a three-tiered fiduciary duty upon the State as a

113. The South Carolina Coastal Council no longer exists and its duties have been
subsumed by South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. See Ocean
and
Coastal
Resource
Management,
DHEC,
http://www.sedhec.gov/Home
AndEnvironment/Water/CoastalManagement/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
114. Sierra Club, 318 S.C. at 128, 580 S.E.2d at 402 (interpreting S.C. CODE ANN. § 4839-10, et seq. (2008 & Supp. 2014)).
115. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-50 (2008).
116. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 354 S.C. 142, 149, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119-20
(2003).
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whole-a duty that rests on every branch of the State government, as a
trustee of the public trust.1 1 7 The first tier of duty includes the State

legislature and agencies passing laws and regulations that are sufficient to
prevent harm from befalling the public interests in the public trust." The
second tier includes the State's executive branch's duty to manage and
protect the enumerated resources in the trust by enforcing legislation. 19 The
third tier includes the duty of the judiciary to hold the legislature and
government accountable as trustees of the Public Trust interests.120 In accord
with this theory, Joseph Sax argued that Illinois CentralR.R. Co. established
that the Public Trust Doctrine imposes a duty both upon the State
government to manage and protect public trust resources, and also upon the
judiciary to "look with considerable skepticism upon any governmental
conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more
restrictive uses or to subject public use to the self-interest of private
parties."121 Thus, under this theory of a three-tiered duty, any party with
standing may bring action against any branch of the state government for
breach of its fiduciary duty to protect that party's interests in the trust.
V.

POTENTIAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE AND THE THREE-TIERED DUTY

The following discussion explores potential claims that might be
brought against the State under the Public Trust Doctrine and the three-tiered
duty it imposeS.122 First, Part A of this section discusses standing
requirements to bring claims under the Public Trust Doctrine 23-an issue
already answered in South Carolina Courts.124 The discussion analyzes
existing South Carolina case law where citizens brought action under the
Public Trust Doctrine to enjoin the State from granting permits to private
parties-some successfully.125 The result establishes parameters suggesting
what sorts of facts a South Carolina court might require a party to present in
order to grant such an injunction. Second, Part B of this section covers an

117. See id.
118. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-50 (2008).
119. See id.
120. See Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 490 (1970).
121. Id. at 489-91.
122. Id.
123. See Part V(A).
124. See Smiley v. S.C. Dept. of Health & Envt'1 Control, 374 S.C. 326, 649 S.E.2d 31
(2007).
125. See Part V(A).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 8
1066

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 68: 1047

issue novel to South Carolina courts whether a court would allow a citizen
to enjoin an appropriate State agency to compel the agency to file a claim
against a private party for injuring public trust interests.126 Last, and most
novel, Part C explores whether the duty the Public Trust Doctrine imposes
on the State falls under traditional trust law, is fiduciary in nature, and
whether breach of that duty gives rise to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
against the State, as has been established in California.127
A.

Standing

It was made clear in Smiley v. S.C. Department of Health and
Environmental Controll28 that an impending threat to a public trust interest
satisfied the standing requirement where it could be shown that certain
behavior was the cause of the threat.129 In Smiley, the plaintiff brought action
to challenge a permit issued by the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource
Management that permitted a private party's removal of sand from a local
beach.1 30 Plaintiff asserted that exercise of the permit threatened to destroy
the hard-packed beach upon which he jogged for rehabilitation purposes,
used for recreation, nature watching, and similar pursuits.131 The court ruled
the plaintiff had standing because the permitting decision directly threatened
the plaintiff s viable personal interests in the Public Trust.132
To take the question of standing one step further, under the State Torts
Claim Act, citizens of the State have standing to bring claims against the
State for the State's gross negligence in administering licensing and
permitting powers.1 33 Thus, private parties in South Carolina have standing
to bring action to both enjoin the State from, and possibly to sue the State
for, permitting other private parties to harm to the protected interests of the
public trust.

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

134

See Part V(B).
See Part V(C).
See Smiley, 374 S.C. at 326, 649 S.E.2d at 31.
Id at 329, 649 S.E.2d at 32-33.
Id at 328-29, 649 S.E.2d at 32.
Id.
Id at 333, 649 S.E.2d at 34.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(12) (2005).
See id.
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B. Enjoining the Statefrom Granting CertainPermits
South Carolina courts have more than once enjoined government offices
from granting permits that would threaten or harm the protected interests of
the public trust.135

First, in State ex rel. Medlock v. South Carolina Coastal Council,3 6 the
League of Women Voters of South Carolina brought action against the
South Carolina Coastal Council, challenging the validity of a permit the
Council had granted to a private citizen that authorized the complete
blockage of a manmade generations-old "navigable waterway." 3 7 The
Council had issued a permit to impound 660 acres of wetlands that was
regularly flooded by normal tidal action located on private property, an
action that would result in the loss of fifty acres of marsh and remove the
660 acres from the Santee Estuarine System. 138 The waterways at issue were
manmade and had historically used in the cultivation of rice, but in recent
years had become regularly used by the general public as natural
watercourses to access the interior of the island, facilitated the movement of
water, and housed various organisms and organic materials important to the
adjacent marshland.1 39 First, the court noted, with regard to its jurisdictional
power to overrule a State Agency's decisions, that the scope of its review
over any administrative agency's decision was statutorily prohibited unless
plaintiff had exhausted all other avenues of remedies provided by the
Agency in question.140 Second, the court recognized that its decision could
only replace that of an agency if the agency's initial decision had been
affected by an "error of law."141 Following its procedural analysis, the court
determined that the waterway was navigable in fact and therefore, under the
Constitution of South Carolina and statutory and case law of South Carolina
with regard to the public trust, the Coastal Council had exceeded its
authority to authorize the complete blockage of navigable streams and
waterways-especially as there was no overriding public interest in

135. See, e.g., State ex rel. Medlock v. S.C. Coastal Council, 289 S.C. 445, 346 S.E.2d
716 (1986) (enjoining the South Carolina Coastal Council from permitting the private
blockage of more than six-hundred acres of navigable wetlands for private purposes because
the exclusive use by a private owner would have detracted that acreage from the Public Trust).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 446-47, 346 S.E.2d at 717.
138. Id. at 447, 346 S.E.2d at 717-18.
139. Id. at 448, 346 S.E.2d at 718.
140. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(g) (1983 Supp.) ("Judicial review upon
exhaustion of administrative remedies .... ")).
141. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(g) (1985 Supp.); Carter v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 281 S.C. 201, 202, 314 S.E.2d 327, 328 (1984).
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impounding the waterway.142 Thus, from this decision it is clear that a South
Carolina court will enjoin an agency's granting of a permit if the permitted
action will risk harm to the trust and the agency cannot show that its
decision to grant such permit was of such significant public interest as to
outweigh those risks.
Furthermore, in State v. Columbia Water Power Co., the Supreme Court
of South Carolina, faced with the issue whether to enjoin Columbia Water
Power Company and the City of Columbia's construction of a bridge that
would inhibit recreational navigability of the waterway over which it
reached, reasoned:
[W]here the wrong is clear, and the injury present and
manifestly impending, the Court will rarely refuse the injunction,
especially if public property, safety, health or welfare is impaired or
threatened, or the nuisance is permanent and maintained in defiance
of a law expressive of the public policy of the State.

. The State,

. .

as a sovereign, holds the property right of unobstructed navigation
of the navigable waters of the State in trust for the people of the
State and of the United States.1 43 This is a property right of great
value. It is well established that an individual has a right to
injunction against threatened, repeated, or continued injury to his
property rights. For a greater reason has the State, as trustee for the
people, a right to the intervention of the Court to protect the
valuable right of free navigation. When the right is clearly
established, as it has been in this case, not only under the common
law and constitutional and statute law of the State .

.

. the Court

would be acting arbitrarily to refuse the injunction. The right of the
State and the proposed violation by the defendants of that right,
being perfectly clear, the Court cannot refuse to enforce the State's
right by enjoining the defendant's proposed obstruction on the
ground that the right of navigation of the Columbia Canal may be of
small value in comparison with the great value to the city of
Columbia of the obstruction it proposes to erect.1 44
The court further clarified that "the Court cannot refuse to ... enjoin[]
[a] defendant's proposed obstruction on the ground that the right of [the

142. Id. at 450, 346 S.E.2d at 719.
143. State v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S.C. 181, 63 S.E. 884 (1909).
144. Id. at 193-94, 63 S.E. at 890.
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public trust] may be of small value in comparison with the great value to the
,,145
[State] of the obstruction it proposes....
However, this power to enjoin a party is limited, as a moving party must
be able to show significant impending injury to the rights under the public
trust doctrine.146 In Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Associates,147 the Supreme

Court of South Carolina denied the grant of an injunction against the Coastal
Council for the issuance of a permit to construct thirty-six docks over public
trust lands, when the court found the Council had shown sufficient evidence
that the construction of the docks would not significantly degrade and limit
public access to shellfish beds or other public trust interest located in the
vicinity of the proposed docks. 14 There, the court concluded, following
testimony by the Council's witnesses that the docks would not "substantially
impair" the public interest in the lands and water by harming marine life,
water quality, or public access, that the permits would not violate the public
trust doctrine.1 49

By synthesizing Columbia Water Power Co. with Sierra Club, in order
for a South Carolina court to grant an injunction against a party under the
Public Trust Doctrine, the moving party must show: (1) a present or
manifestly impending "substantial" injury; (2) to a clearly established Public
Trust interest, no matter how comparatively insignificant.1 5 0
C. Enjoining the State to BringAction Against the InjuriousParty
As previously discussed, California's courts have ruled that under
traditional trust law, private parties have the right to bring action against the
State to compel the State to protect Public Trust rights by controlling other
private parties' actions that affect the trust, but private parties cannot enforce
the Public Trust Doctrine directly against other private parties.15 ' This issue
is entirely novel in South Carolina. Presently, no case law provides whether
a South Carolina court would recognize the "citizen is to State" relationship
with regard to the Public Trust as one of "beneficiary is to trustee."
However, South Carolina courts have consistently, if not uniformly, referred

145.
146.
(emphasis
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
2008).

Id. at 194, 63 S.E. at 890.
See Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assocs., 318 S.C. 119, 456 S.E.2d 397 (1995)
added).
Id.
Id. at 125, 128, 456 S.E.2d at 399, 402.
Id. at 128, 456 S.E.2d at 402.
See id.
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 588, 591 (Ct. App.
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to the public as "beneficiaries" as to that which the State holds in "trust,"
and which the State has a "duty to protect."15 Thus, it seems the South
Carolina judiciary has already determined that the State's responsibility to
protect the trust is fiduciary in nature, although no court has expressly stated
that the relationship of the citizens and the State with regard to the Trust is
one governed by traditional trust law. However, as South Carolina courts
appear to have adopted a modem view of the Public Trust Doctrine, lower
courts may look to other modem-view states' Public Trust doctrines.1 53 If So,

a South Carolina court may conclude the "citizen is to State" relationship
under the Public Trust Doctrine is governed under the South Carolina Trust
code.
Under the South Carolina Trust code, a trustee has a duty to "secure
payment of any choses in action" arising from the trust property.1 54 A
trustee's violation of a duty owed to the beneficiary is a breach of the
trust; 15 to remedy this breach, 15

a court may compel the trustee15

to

perform that duty.15 8 Therefore, if a right to sue in the name of the Public
Trust arises against a private party, it is a duty of the State as trustee to
pursue that action. If the State fails to pursue that action, the State has
breached its duty as trustee and may be compelled by the court to bring
action as trustee against the injurious party on behalf of the beneficiaries of
the trust. 159 Therefore, if a South Carolina court looks to the Trust code to
govern Public Trust relationships, it is almost certain to rule that a private
party beneficiary may bring action to compel the appropriate State agency to
sue the injurious party.160

Conversely, under the Trust code, a person who deals in good faith with
a trustee without knowledge that the trustee is exceeding or improperly
exercising his powers is protected from liability.161 This section of the code,
if applied to Public Trust issues, would exculpate any private party found to
have dealt with the State with a good faith belief that following the State's

152. See, e.g., McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 354 S.C. 142, 580 S.E.2d 116 (2003)
(holding that the State cannot allow harm to befall certain enumerated aspects of the State's
waterways which it holds in trust for the public as beneficiaries).
153. See id.
154. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-809, cmt. (2009) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 175 cmt. a, c, & d (1959)).
155. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1001(a) (2009).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1001(b)(1) (2009).
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-1012(a) (2009).
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regulations was sufficient to avoid liability. This leaves open the question:
what happens when a private party follows all the State's rules, but those
rules are insufficient to protect the Public Trust?
Ultimately, this is an issue that has not been faced by a South Carolina
court. The fact that the issue is entirely novel leaves any number of
possibilities open, but it seems more likely that, like the court in Chernaik, a
South Carolina court would consider the issue to be political in nature and
one that should be answered by legislation.
D. Breach of a FiduciaryDuty Owed to the Public
In South Carolina, to recover for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff
must prove (1) the existence of a fiduciary duty, (2) a breach of that duty
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, and (3) damages proximately
resulting from the wrongful conduct of the defendant.162 Presently, there is
no jurisdiction that allows for a private party to bring action against a state to
recover for harms to the Public Trust that resulted from a breach of the
fiduciary duty imposed under the Public Trust Doctrine. However, it only
goes to reason that under trust law, private citizens should be able to recover
for harm to their Public Trust interests and ultimately recover funds that
would be redirected to repair the harmed trust property interests. This
section discusses the legal theory of how a citizen might succeed in a claim
against the State for breach of its fiduciary duty in being grossly negligent
by granting foreseeably harmful permits.
First, for this theory to work, it must be established that South Carolina
owes to its citizens a fiduciary duty in the form of a "trustee to beneficiary"
dynamic to protect and maintain the Public Trust. Whether a fiduciary
relationship has been breached is a question of fact; whether one should be
imposed between two classes of people is a question of law.163 A South
Carolina court concluding that the State owes its citizens a fiduciary duty as
established under the Trust code with regard to Public Trust property seems
possible, if not likely, as South Carolina courts have in the past expressed a
modem affect with regard to the Trust, as discussed above.
Under the Trust code, a trustee has an affirmative duty to administer a
trust in goodfaith in accordance with the trust's terms and purposes and the
interests of the beneficiaries,164 as well as to take all reasonable steps to

162. RFT Mgmt. Co. v. Tinsley & Adams, L.L.P., 399 S.C. 322, 335-36, 732 S.E.2d
166, 173 (2012).
163. Hendricks v. Clemson Univ., 353 S.C. 449, 459, 578 S.E.2d 711, 715 (2003)
(overruled on other grounds).
164. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-801 (2009).
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control and protect the trust property. 16 Moreover, a trustee must administer
the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries--a conflict between
personal and fiduciary interests of the trustee is automatically void if the
sale, encumbrance, or transaction is detrimental to the beneficiaries' interests
in the trust property.166 Additionally, any beneficiary whose rights are
threatened has standing to sue a trustee.1 67 "Beneficiary" includes anyone
with a vested interest to present or future distributions.
So, if trust law applies to the relationship between the State and its
citizens under the Public Trust Doctrine, the State is burdened with a duty to
make a good faith effort and take reasonable steps to manage and protect the
Public Trust resources from "activity that substantially impairs the public
interest in" the trust.169 Moreover, the State is bound by a duty not to engage
in transactions that would harm the Public Trust, even if the harm is
slight. 17 Under this analysis, it is clear that any State or state agency
decision that poses a threat or puts at risk the public trust is an automatic
breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the public.
However, unlike a regular citizen, the State is granted limited liability
against certain tort claims.1 7 1 Under the South Carolina Torts Claims Act,
the State, nor any agency or entity of the State, may be found liable for a
loss resulting from failure of the legislature or judiciary to enforce or enact
any statute or regulation.172 Additionally, liability may not be established for
a loss resulting from the State exercising its power to license or issue
permits, except in cases when the power was exercised in a grossly negligent
manner.173 This, of course, throws a sizable wrench into the cogs of any
attempt to judicially hold state agencies accountable for harm caused to the
Public Trust via negligent permit granting. However, if it can be established
that the State or its agents acted in a grossly negligent manner with regard to
the granting of a license or permit, recovery may be had under a claim
against the State for gross negligence in the breach of the fiduciary duty
under the Public Trust Doctrine.1 74

165. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-809 (2009).
166. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-802 (2009).
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197, 198, 199, 200 (1959).
168. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 (2007).
169. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
170. See id.
171. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-20, 40, 60 (2005 & Supp. 2014).
172. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(1), (2) (2005).
173. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(12) (2005).
174. Hollins v. Richland Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 310 S.C. 486, 487, 427 S.E.2d 654, 655
(1993) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(25) (Supp. 1991)).
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Gross negligence in South Carolina has been defined by the courts in a
number of ways. 175 It has been held to be "the failure to exercise slight
"the intentional conscious failure to do something which it is
care,"
incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought
not to do,"' 7 7 and "[to be] a relative term, [meaning] the absence of care that
is necessary under the circumstances."17 8
So, stringing all of the relevant law together: if a South Carolina court
(1) recognizes that the Public Trust Doctrine imposes a fiduciary duty upon
the State, then (2) the court should also recognize a breach of that duty for
which the State may be held accountable when (3) a State agency grants
permission or license to private parties to engage in harmful behavior (4)
without the State taking the reasonable steps that are incumbent upon the
State to prevent substantial harm to the Public Trust. Seems clear enough,
right? However, the "reasonable steps" the State must undertake as trustee of
the Public Trust is pretty murky.
E. So, What is "Reasonable"Anyway?
It is simple to say that the State must take "all reasonable steps" to
prevent damage to the property of the Public Trust, but it is difficult to
define what those reasonable steps are, because it is impossible to predict
with certainty the severity of yet-unperformed actions' impacts that might
lead to future damages of protected Public Trust resources.
On one hand, all coastal development will at some time directly or
indirectly negatively affect the Public Trust to some degree. However, it is
impossible to separate the effects of thousands of day-to-day seemingly
harmless licensed/permitted individual acts from one another to extract the
value of the individual harms that cumulatively will "substantially affect"
Public Trust interests in the future. If the courts were to interpret strictly the
State's Public Trust Doctrine, the result would be a complete bar on
building, development, residing, or visiting of coastal lands, and possibly
inland development, too. Under this paradox, the only way to truly protect
Public Trust interests is to prevent everyone from using the Public Trust,

175. Id. at 490, 427 S.E.2d at 656.
176. Anderson v. Ballenger, 166 S.C. 44, 55, 164 S.E. 313, 317 (1932) (citing Ford v.
Atl. Coast Line R.R., 169 S.C. 41, 168 S.E. 143 (1932)).
177. Richardson v. Hambright, 296 S.C. 504, 506, 374 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1988) (emphasis
added).
178. Hicks v. McCandlish, 221 S.C. 410, 415, 70 S.E.2d 629, 631 (1952) (emphasis
added).
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which of course divests every one of his or her Public Trust interests.1 79 Of
course this result is unreasonable.
On the other hand, the rate at which the State is permitting areas along
South Carolina's coast to be developed arguably falls outside the scope of
"reasonable steps" to protect the Public Trust. In its 2015 Recreational
Water Quality Scorecard, Charleston Waterkeeper, a non-profit
environmental group based out of Charleston, SC, after testing water for
fecal indicator bacteria, enterococci, labeled nine of fifteen tested Charleston
waterways as "swimming not recommended," another five as "proceed with
caution," and only one as "safe for swimming."1so The same sites were
tested in 2014, with nine waterways labeled as "swimming not
recommended," one as "proceed with caution," and five as "safe for
swimming."' 8 ' In 2013, the same sites were tested and only eight waterways
failed, while the remaining seven were safe to swim.182 Additionally,

following any flooding of the Charleston area, which occurs during almost
any rainfall that coincides with a high tide, the South Carolina Department
of Health and Environmental Control will close shellfish grounds for
harvesting as a result of high levels of coliform bacteria' 8 3-this is a direct
and substantial effect on the public's interest in fishing in the Public Trust.
So, has the State acted in gross negligence in granting permits for such
development to occur? That depends entirely on whether the State or its
permitting agencies should have recognized that overdevelopment would
lead to this type of pollution. The fact of the matter is that countless data
existed prior to South Carolina's boom in coastal development that showed
that urban development near waterways typically causes these exact
*
184
issues.

&

&

179. Would this be a Fifth Amendment Takings issue?
180. Charleston Waterkeeper 2015 Recreational Water Quality Scorecard, CHARLESTON
WATERKEEPER,
http://charlestonwaterkeeper.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/scorecard2015-web.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
181. Charleston Waterkeeper 2014 Recreational Water Quality Scorecard, CHARLESTON
WATERKEEPER,
http://charlestonwaterkeeper.org/wp-content/uploads/201 5/02/2015-score
card-final-web.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
182. Charleston Waterkeeper 2013 Recreational Water Quality Scorecard, CHARLESTON
WATERKEEPER, http://charlestonwaterkeeper.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/scorecard-finallow-res-spreads-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
183. Marine-Shellfish, S.C. DEP'T OF NAT. RES., http://www.dnr.sc.gov/marine/shellfish/
regs.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
184. See H. Heukelekian, et al., Water Pollution, 25 SEWAGE & INDUSTRIAL WASTES
653 (June 1953); Richard D. Hoak, Water Supply and Pollution Control, 25 SEWAGE
INDUSTRIAL WASTES 1438 (Dec. 1953); H. Heukelekian, et al., Water Pollution, 30 SEWAGE
& INDUSTRIAL WASTES 839 (June 1958); L. Coin, et al., Modern Microbiological
Virological Aspects of Water Pollution, 1 ADVANCES IN WATER POLLUTION RESEARCH 1
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Of course, the first and most obvious "reasonable step" by the State to
minimize the effects of developmental pollution is to pass legislation
tailored to do exactly that. The State has done this by creating agencies
tasked with defining pollution, how it should be controlled, and penalties for
those who disobey the regulations.8 5 Ideally, these regulations should
effectively deter polluters. However, the state of the health of South
Carolina's waterways suggest one of two possibilities: first, the regulations'
accompanying penalties are insufficient to deter polluters from polluting, or,
second, if the regulations' penalties are deterring pollution, then the
regulation is insufficient with regard to the parameters of "acceptable
pollution." 8 6 There are fourteen of fifteen water-quality-tested creeks in
Charleston County that are reported un-swimmable due to runoff pollution
this is not "acceptable." 8 7 Not only do the regulations leave gaps in what is
to be controlled,
but the agencies either fail to enforce the regulation, or
private parties ignore the regulation without punishment. 8 9 In conclusion,
efforts by the State to pass regulations alone are insufficient to be deemed
"reasonable steps" to protect the Public Trust.
To satisfy the "reasonable steps" requirement of South Carolina's Trust
law, the State must police development with a scrutinizing eye, regulating
not only citizens but itself, and, if the regulations are breached by any party,
the State must take action to correct the injuries to the Public Trust, lest the
State be in breach of its fiduciary duty to protect the Public Trust.
Thus, under the three-tiered duty imposed by the Public Trust, the left
hand must watch what the right hand is doing: self-monitoring and
regulation by all branches of the State government is required for the State

&

(1965); Edison L. Quan, et al., Effects of Surface Runoff & Waste Dischargeinto the Southern
Sector ofKaneohe Bay, WATER RESEARCH CTR., UNV. OF HAW. AT MANOA, 35 (Jan. 1970).
185. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-50 (2008).
186. See Bo Peterson, Fishable? Swimmable? Charleston Waters in Trouble, POST
COURIER
(Charleston,
S.C.)
(Apr.
19,
2015),
http://www.postandcourier.com/
article/20150419/PC16/150419369/1177.
187. Id.
188. Codi Kozacek, While South CarolinaFloods, U.S. Wrestles with Urban Stormwater,
CIRCLE OF BLUE (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2015/world/whilesouth-carolina-floods-u-s-wrestles-with-urban-stormwater/ (noting failures in the Federal
Clean Water Act to include swaths of varieties of runoff pollution that has been shown to
directly impair nearly 240,000 kilometers of rivers and streams and more than 404,000
hectares (1,000,000 acres) of lakes, ponds, and reservoirs).
189. See Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Are Neglected, at a Cost in Suffering, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13water.html;
Julie
Turkewitz, EnvironmentalAgency Uncorks its Own Toxic Water Spill at Colorado Mine, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/us/durango-colorado-mine-spillenvironmental-protection-agency.html.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

29

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 8
1076

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 68: 1047

satisfy this duty. The legislature must pass sufficiently stringent laws with
the purpose of protecting the public trust. The executive branch must
successfully enforce these laws. And if the laws are at risk of being broken
or if the Public Trust is harmed, the judiciary must hold accountable those
responsible in order to prevent or repair the damages. Finally, if the
legislature fails to enact sufficiently protective laws, or if the executive fails
to properly enforce those laws, the judiciary should have the power hold
those branches accountable for harm that arises out of the failures.
VI. CONCLUSION

Whether one is interested in protecting the Lowcountry's economy,
culture, or environment, it is imperative that efforts be made to better control
the urban and industrial development along South Carolina's coast. As the
State legislature and State policing have yet to successfully protect the
interests of the Public Trust, it falls upon the judiciary of the State to enjoin
granting of certain harmful permits and hold not only third parties, but the
State itself, accountable for damages. It is an unfortunate fact that balancing
industry and development with environmental interests is difficult, and
sometimes impossible, but South Carolina has too much to lose by risking
the health of its waterways for general financial gain-especially when the
source of financial gain will likely harm other avenues of income, like
coastal tourism. As the case law and basic common sense makes clear, the
Public Trust interests of all citizens should always carry greater weight when
balanced against financial interests of a few.
However, without such actions being brought to the courts' attention by
injured parties, the law will not be established, nor will the resources be
satisfactorily managed or protected. Ultimately, the duty is not only upon the
State, but upon the citizens of the State to draw attention to the harm that
urban development and industrialization causes the Public Trust.
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